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Preface 
This is a report from Programme for Health Economics in Bergen, HEB. The paper is 
written by research director Jan Erik Askildsen and research fellow Tor Helge Holmås 
at HEB and Department of Economics, University of Bergen, and professor Badi 
Baltagi, Texas A&M University.  
HEB is a collaboration between Department of Economics and Department of 
Public Health and Primary Health Care at the University of Bergen, Norwegian School 
of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), and Institute for Research in 
Economics and Business Administration (SNF). Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, 
the Rokkan Centre, at Bergen University Research Foundation, holds the admini-
strative responsibility. The research programme is financed by the Research Council of 
Norway (NFR). HEB is a centre for economic research into health and health care. The 
main objective is to provide knowledge on organisation and governance structures of 
the health care sector. 
HEB has organised its research activities within three areas. This article is part of 
the topic «Resources and inequalities in health» as project no. 3.1: Labour supply in the 
health care sector. The article is one of several, which study the labour market situation 
for health personnel in Norway. Whereas this paper investigates labour supply by 
employed nurses, Tor Helge Holmås in a companion paper investigates conditions for 
nurses to remain within the health sector, see HEB reprint no. 11/02. The topic is also 
dealt with as chapter 3 in the book (in Norwegian) Helse, økonomi og politikk, Cappelen 
forlag 2001. For further information on the research activity at HEB, see 
http://heb.rokkan.uib.no/.  
In the article «Will increased wages reduce shortage of nurses? A panel data 
analysis of nurses’ labour supply» the authors analyse the importance of wages to 
obtain a desired labour supply of nurses to the Norwegian health acre sector. There is 
disagreement as to how important wages are for solving the alleged shortage of nurses. 
It is shown that nurses are willing to work longer hours when wages increase. 
However, it may be a problem that health care institutions are not willing to demand 
longer hours at higher wages. This may be due to the reliance on block grants for 
financing health care institutions. Thus, due attention has to paid to the demand side 
as well as the supply side when policy to mitigate shortage of health personnel is 
considered.  
 
Bergen, December 18, 2002 
 
Jan Erik Askildsen 
Research director HEB 
The Rokkan Centre 
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Abstract1 
Shortage of nurses is a problem in several countries. It is an unsettled question whether 
increasing wages constitute a viable policy for extracting more labour supply from 
nurses. In this paper we use a unique matched panel data set of Norwegian nurses 
covering the period 1993 –1998 to estimate wage elasticities. The data set includes 
detailed information on 19,638 individuals over 6 years totalling 69,122 observations. 
The estimated wage elasticity after controlling for individual heterogeneity, sample 
selection and instrumenting for possible endogeneity is 0. 21. Individual and insti-
tutional features are statistically significant and important for working hours. Contrac-
tual arrangements as represented by shift work are also important for hours of work, 
and omitting information about this common phenomenon will underestimate the 
wage effect.  
                                                                 
1  This paper has benefited from seminar presentations at University of Bergen and Norwegian 
School of Economics and Business Administration, and from comments from participants at the 
Fourth European Conference on Health Economics in Paris, Econometric Society European 
Meeting in Venice, and the 11 th European Workshop on Econometrics and Health Economics in 
Lund, 2002. 
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Sammendrag 
I mange land er det er problem at det er vanskelig å skaffe tilstrekkelig med kvalifiserte 
sykepleiere til helseinstitusjoner.Derfor finnes der også en rekke studier som har sett 
på hvilken betydning lønn og andre forhold har for både rekruttering av sykepleiere, 
og for å få utdannete sykepleiere til å arbeide flere timer. Siden sykepleiere er en 
gruppe med relativt utstrakt bruk av deltidsarbeide, er det grunn til å tro at en aktiv 
lønnspolitikk kan ha stor betydning for arbeidstilbudet for denne gruppen.  Spørsmålet 
er om økt lønn er tilstrekkelig til å løse problemet med mangel på kvalifisert helse-
personell.  
I denne artikkelen bruker vi et unikt datamateriale bestående av lønns- og 
arbeidstidsopplysninger fra Kommunenes Sentralforbuds lønns- og personalregister 
(PAI-registeret), samt bakgrunnsinformasjon fra flere registre i Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
Undersøkelsen dekker perioden 1993 –1998.Resultatene er basert på data for 19. 638 
kvinnelige sykepleiere som arbeider i kommunalt og fylkeskommunalt helsevesen.I 
arbeidet taes det hensyn til individuelle karakteristika som familiesituasjon og bosted, 
samt hva slags helseinstitusjon og type stilling som en arbeider i. Det viser seg også å 
være viktig å ta hensyn til om sykepleierne arbeider skift eller har en kontrakt med 
vanlig arbeidstid.  
Vi finner at økt lønn fører til at sykepleiere vil jobbe flere timer. Den såkalte 
lønnselastisiteten er på 0. 21 i den foretrukne modellspesifikasjon. På den annen side 
synes også faktorer på etterspørselssiden å være viktige. Lønn og arbeidstid er nemlig 
bestemt i et samvirke mellom sykepleierne, også representert med sin fagforening, og 
sykehus og kommunale helseinstitusjoner som etterspørrere. Resultatene tyder på at 
det ikke er åpenbart at helseinstitusjoner vil ønske flere arbeidstimer hvis lønna øker. 
En viktig politikkimplikasjon er således at lønnspolitikk bør sees i sammenheng med 
hvordan helseinstitusjoner blir finansiert og styrt.  
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Introduction 
The health sector is labour intensive with a continuous demand for highly trained and 
specialized labour. Several countries suffer to a varying degree from a shortage of key 
health personnel. This is particularly true for the profession of nursing. Both UK and 
Scandinavian countries report a scarcity of nurses within the hospital sector as well as 
in other parts of the public health sector. Remedies are not clear. The nurses’ unions 
claim that wages are too low, making the nurses unwilling to participate or work 
sufficiently long hours to meet stated demands for nursing. In Norway 40% of the 
nurses work part-time. Several studies report low wage elasticities for nurses, see 
Antonazzo et. al (2000) for a survey of US and UK studies. Anecdotal evidence often 
hints at an unwillingness of nurses to work longer hours, and that several decide to 
leave nursing altogether. A problem with existing studies is that they are often based 
on cross sections, and with missing information on variables of importance for the 
nurses’ work decisions. In this paper we use a unique panel data set of Norwegian 
health care personnel to investigate the labour supply of nurses. We have access to 
information about individual characteristics, including the health care institution to 
which the nurse is affiliated, actual working hours, wages and type of contract for each 
nurse.  
Wage policy may be of importance for the health sector if it can reduce the labour 
scarcity problem. For a work group like nurses, there should be reasons to believe that 
increased wages may actually contribute to increasing nurses’ labour supply. 
Surprisingly, the evidence seems somewhat to the contrary. The Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986) survey indicates that labour supply elasticities for females are 
positive, i. e. , the positive substitution effect outweighs the negative income effect. 
Since a large percentage of nurses are female, it is expected that such results would 
carry over to nurses’ labour supply. Furthermore, since a large percentage of nurses 
work part-time, changes in the individual labour supply should be easier for this group 
than for nurses working full-time. Existing empirical studies, often based on cross 
sections, reveal quite small, and sometimes even negative, effects of wages on nurses’ 
labour supply (see Link, 1992, Ault and Rutman, 1994, Phillips, 1995). Does this mean 
that female nurses behave differently from female workers in the general population? 
Or could it be that low wage elasticities are due to the omission of relevant features of 
the labour markets for health personnel? These omitted features may be job attributes 
or contractual arrangements. It could also be that the selection problem is at work in 
explaining why nurses, when deciding on hours of work, are not very sensitive to 
wage changes.  
There are several econometric issues at hand. First, wages cannot be considered 
as exogenous in a labour supply equation. In the UK and Scandinavian countries, the 
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market for health personnel is monopsonistic consisting of one or a few large buyers 
(see e. g. Hirsch and Schumacher (1995, 1998)). This implies that hospitals and other 
community health institutions consider the marginal incremental cost of increasing 
wages rather than the wage rate itself. This means that the buyer faces a marginal cost 
which is steeper than the wage curve. Even though the hospitals claim that they would 
employ more workers at the going rate, it is not clear that they would be willing to pay 
the additional cost of increasing the wage for all nurses. This may be of particular 
relevance in an institutional setting where the demand side of the labour market faces 
more or less a given budget, which is the case in most public health care systems. We 
do not attempt to control for monopsony tendencies in the labour market as such. 
However, by controlling for institution and type of work performed, some effects from 
a non-competitive labour market may be captured, since the availability and 
attractiveness of the different institutions may help determine employer selection. 
Using instrumental variable estimation we take into consideration the simultaneous 
determination of wages and hours of work, thus singling out demand effects of 
importance for wage determination.  
Second, nurses work under different contractual arrangements. Quite often they 
work shift hours, which affect contractual working hours as well as hourly pay. Shift 
hours are generally compensated with an hourly wage premium, and the mandated 
weekly working hours are shorter for these shift workers. We believe that it is 
important to correct for shift work, and that the wage effect will be biased if a variable 
representing such contractual work arrangements is omitted. The reason is twofold; if 
shift hours are considered burdensome, a wage compensation is required (Moore and 
Viscusi, 1990) and if this compensation is insufficient, lower labour supply is offered, 
and the estimated wage effect will be downwardly biased. It may also be the case that 
shift workers consider it too demanding to work long hours, therefore they respond 
less to wage changes than those working on ordinary day time contracts. In this case, 
the derived wage effect underestimates the true effect for some groups, and may give 
the wrong signals when considering an appropriate wage policy for nurses.  
Third, when investigating labour supply, care should be taken to control for 
selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. There is likely to be a selection process 
driving the decision to work or not to work, as well as where to work. Since we only 
observe nurses holding a job in specific health care institutions, not controlling for 
selection will result in biased estimates. Similarly, labour market behaviour is also 
driven by individual characteristics only some of which are observed by the researcher. 
A panel data set will make it possible to correct for selection bias as well as unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
We have access to a unique panel data set of Norwegian health personnel 
covering the period 1993 –1998. The individualized data with information about 
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wages, working hours and type of work are matched with other data sets which 
include information about the individual and their household. We can also track 
trained nurses who are temporarily or permanently employed outside the public 
sector. For nurses employed by local and regional municipalities, information on 
wages and working hours are collected by the Norwegian Association of Local and 
Regional Authorities  (NALRA) for one month (October) during each year. Statistics 
Norway provides information on background variables for all registered nurses during 
the relevant period. We have controlled for the type of position held by each 
individual, and for the fact that nurses on shift contracts have shorter mandated 
working hours. The variable representing the burden of shift work is highly significant, 
and contributes to a negative effect on working hours. Thus, the inclusion of variables 
representing contractual arrangements is warranted, as is the inclusion of individual 
and institutional controls.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  The next section provides some 
background information on the labour market for nurses. The data and sample 
properties are presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the empirical specification and 
discusses some empirical modelling issues. Section 5 presents the empirical results, 
while Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
Institutional features of the labour market for 
nurses 
According to OECD Health Data 2000, Norway is one of the countries with the highest 
density of nurses. In 1996 there were 14. 9 registered nurses per 1000 inhabitants2, 
outnumbering most other countries. Simultaneously, the Norwegian nurses’ union 
claims there are more than 4000 full time vacancies. The number of nurses includes 
registered nurses only, i. e. auxiliary nurses are excluded. The difference between 
registered and auxiliary nurses is length and type of education. Registered nurses 
receive 3 (4) years of education at college level, whereas auxiliary nurses are trained at 
the secondary school level. It is worth noting that there is limited capacity in training of 
nurses, as judged by student applications. From the mid eighties a shift in the 
composition of nursing labour in favour of registered nurses has taken place especially 
at hospitals. In the rest of this paper we confine ourselves to registered nurses.  
In Norway, most nurses are employed by publicly owned institutions. Like the 
UK and other Scandinavian countries, the public sector is responsible for most of the 
                                                                 
2 The comparable numbers for 1997 are 9.5 registered nurses per 1000 inhabitants for  Norway 
and Germany, 4.5 for the UK and 5.9 for France. 
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production of health care services and for its financing3. Specialist services were in the 
period of investigation the responsibility of counties. Somatic and psychiatric hospitals 
are owned and financed by 19 counties4. Exceptions include two national and some 
private, specialized hospitals. Primary health care is the responsibility of municipalities 
but a considerable share of general practitioners run private practices. Nurses 
employed by these private practices are not in our data set, nor are nurses engaged by 
private specialists. Municipalities are also responsible for general public health 
services, and institutions for the elderly, including somatic and psychiatric nursing 
homes. Counties and municipalities are financed from risk adjusted grants from the 
government using local taxes, and to a minor degree from user charges (co-payment). 
Owners of somatic hospitals (counties) also receive activity dependent DRG based 
payment. It is fair to say that the public health institutions are facing periodic (yearly) 
budget limits, but it is a matter of perception as to how strict these budget restrictions 
are. This is a fact of some importance when deriving wage effects. Given a fixed 
budget, institutions may not be willing to let nurses work longer hours following a 
wage increase, a phenomenon also hinted at in the monopsony theory approach to the 
nursing labour market.  
Wages are bargained by the nurses’ union on the one side, and NALRA, 
representing municipalities and counties, on the other side. Bargaining takes place 
every year. There may also be bargaining once a year at a local level, and each 
institution will have some discretion in bargaining individual wages by putting 
workers into specific wage categories. The bargained tariffs determine wage scales for 
every position and work category, including shift and overtime compensations. 
Individual contractual working hours are determined at the specific institution, at 
which level it is also determined who and how many to employ. Thus, the bargaining 
process resembles a ‘right-to-manage’ framework. Bargaining theory predicts wages 
increasing with union bargaining power, which in the public sector is likely to imply 
wages increasing with the financial strength of the relevant health care institution. 
Commonly, positions are offered as full time or as a share of full time, and as shift 
work or ordinary day work. Often nurses work shorter hours than full time. Overtime 
is only paid when weekly hours of work exceed full time, which is 37. 5 hours for 
ordinary work and 35. 5 hours for those who work shift. Nurses are not allowed to 
plan for overtime work but may of course work overtime in cases of particular 
demand.  
                                                                 
3 In 1997, according to OECD Health Data 2000, 82.7% of expenditures on health were public 
and only 0.1% of hospital beds were in private institutions. 
4 As of 2002, the central government has taken over responsibility of specialist care. 
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Data 
The data used in this analysis consist of administrative data for the years 1993 –1998 
collected from different official data registers. Statistics Norway (SSB) provides 
detailed background information on all individuals who have completed their nursing 
education. The data from SSB include information on whether the individual works or 
not, where the individual works and yearly income. However, this data set does not 
include information about wage rates or the number of hours worked. Information 
about the latter is obtained by merging the data from SSB with data from NALRA’s 
personnel register5. The NALRA register includes information on all individuals 
working in the health sector in Norwegian counties and municipalities. An important 
advantage of this register is that it contains very detailed individual information on 
standard wages, overtime, compensation for work outside normal hours, and total 
number of hours worked. Furthermore, information about the workplace of the nurse 
(hospital, nursing home, etc), and kind of job, like staff nurse, ward nurse etc. , is also 
included. Using register data should reduce the problems associated with measure-
ment errors which usually plague survey type data6.  
Our sample covers the period 1993 –1998. We include female nurses younger 
than 62 years of age who are registered with a completed nursing qualification and 
employed by municipalities or counties7. Nurses working in institutions which do not 
provide detailed information for all years were excluded. We will argue below that this 
limitation of the data set does not seriously affect the representativeness of our 
analysis. We have detailed wage and contractual information on 19,638 individuals 
over five years, totalling 69,122 observations. This sample constitutes almost one half of 
the relevant population of Norwegian nurses. Column 1 of Table 1 reports the total 
sample of female nurses per year. Column 2 reports the number of nurses out of work. 
The percentage of nurses out of work is relatively constant over time, at approximately 
8%. Column 3 reports the number of nurses employed by institutions covered by the 
NALRA register. Column 4 includes nurses working in institutions which have 
provided detailed and consistent wage information.  
 
                                                                 
5 Notice that the data in the NALRA register is collected only for the month of October each 
year. The data for this month is considered representative, since there are no public holidays 
and it is not a typical holiday month. 
6 Validation studies use administrative data to examine the presence and magnitude of 
measurement errors in survey data (see for e.g. Poterba and Summers (1986) and Bollinger 
(1998)). 
7 We have excluded male nurses (4613). Inclusion of male nurses will have a marginal effect on 
our results. Nurses older than 62 (1400) are excluded since they will have access to different 
pension schemes. Also nurses registered with more than one job in the health sector are 
excluded (2743). 
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(Table 1 about here) 
 
In Table 2 we report the sample frequencies by the number of years worked. 
Obviously, nurses who have not been at work in any of the six years cannot be found 
in the NALRA register, explaining the missing observations in the first row. 
Comparing the samples, we see that nurses are observed for fewer periods in the 
NALRA samples than in the total sample of female nurses. The reasons are threefold. 
First, an individual may work for all years but may temporarily leave a specific 
institution covered by the NALRA registers. Second, a specific institution may not file 
adequate reports for all years. This will affect the number of observations in the most 
restricted sample. Thus, missing observations in the NALRA sub sample are not due to 
choices of individual nurses but lack of reports from an employer. Third, an individual 
may leave the labour force for one or more years. As shown below, there seems to be 
little variation in the characteristics of nurses among the samples.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 3. A more detailed explanation 
is given in the Appendix.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Sample statistics are reported in Table 4. If no figure is reported, it means that there are 
no observations for that variable in that sample. For the NARLA sub-sample of female 
nurses, the average age is 37 years with 35% of the nurses being single. The majority of 
these nurses work in somatic hospitals (62%) or nursing homes (20%) with the 
remaining nurses engaged in home nursing (10%), at psychiatric institutions (5%), in 
health services (1%), and others (3%). Senior nurses comprise only 2% of our sample, 
while 16% are ward nurses, 20% are nursing specialists, and the remaining majority 
(62%) work as staff nurses. The average years of experience during the sample period 
was 12. 5 years, and the average number of children below 18 years of age was 1. 2. 
Nurses with children below the age of 3 comprise 22% of our sample, while those with 
children between the ages of 3 and 7 comprise 29% of the sample.  
Note that the individual specific variables (age, experience, number of children, 
etc. ) are very similar across the samples. The geographical variables, on the other 
hand, indicate an under-representation of nurses in central areas in the NALRA 
samples. In fact, most government owned institutions are situated in the capital and 
private health care tends to be over-represented in major cities. It is also the case that 
large hospitals and municipalities are less likely to report the necessary information for 
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all years to the NALRA register. In total, barring a slight geographical mis-
representation, the data in the restricted sample seems representative for the total 
sample of female nurses.  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
Econometric model 
We will consider the following panel data nursing labour supply model with sample 
selection 
  itiitit xy eab ++=
* ;     Ni ,...,1= ;     Tt ,...,1= ,     (4. 1) 
  itiitit uzd ++= hg
* ,       (4. 2)  
  [ ]0  1 * ³= itit dd        (4. 3) 
Here, *ity  is the number of hours supplied by nurse i  in period t . Our panel covers 
19,638 nurses over maximum 6 years and the total number of observations is 69,122. 
The unknown parameters we wish to estimate are b  (and g ), while itx  and itz  are 
vectors of explanatory variables. All variables in itz  and itx  are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous8 and itz  and itx  might contain common elements. The ite  and itu  are 
unobserved disturbances. The sample selection problem arises because the hours of 
work variable *ity  is only observable for nurses with 1=itd , i. e. , those who are 
present in the NALRA sub sample. If ia  and ite  are dependent on itd , the conditional 
expectation of (4. 1) will differ from bitx . Applying OLS only on the observations for 
nurses who participate will therefore lead to biased estimates of the b  vector. If the 
sample selection process is constant over all periods a difference estimator eliminates 
the sample selection bias. In this case both the unobserved individual effect and the 
sample selection effect are differenced out.  
However, in general there is no reason to expect the sample selection process to 
be time invariant, and to correct for sample selection we use the estimator proposed by 
Kyriazidou (1997). The individual effects, ia  and ih  are allowed to be correlated with 
the explanatory variables ( itx  and itz ) and the error terms ( ite  and itu ). No distri-
butional assumptions are made concerning the error terms. The estimator relies on 
time differencing (4. 1) for those observations that have 1== isit dd , st ¹ 9. This 
                                                                 
8 We consider the case where itx  is allowed to contain endogenous variables below. 
9 Our panel consists of six periods, thus the maximum number of differences is fifteen. 
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strategy will eliminate the individual-specific component but not the sample selection 
effect, unless the conditional expectation below is equal to zero: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
isit
iisitisiisitit
iisitis
dddd
dd
ll
zeze
zee
-
º==-==
===-
,1|E,1|E
,1|E it
                                         (4. 4) 
Here ( )iiisitisiti zzxx haz ,,,,,= . To see that this may not necessarily equal zero, notice 
that the sample selection effect in period t, may be expressed as 
  ( )iiisisiitititit zuzuE zhghgel ,,| +£+£=  
       ( )( )iisitititiisiit uuFzz zehghg |,,;, ++L= .  
We see that the sample selection effect depends on the conditioning vector iz  and the 
joint conditional distribution of the error terms. Since this distribution may vary over 
nurses, as well as over time for the same nurse, there is in general no reason to expect 
the unobserved conditional expectation in (4. 4) to equal zero. To ensure the sample 
selection effect is the same in two periods, it is assumed that L  is time invariant10. If 
this is the case, itl  and isl  will be equal only if gg isit zz = . Thus, applying first-
differences in equation (4. 1) eliminates both the individual time invariant effect and 
the selection effect. Notice that since first-differences are taken on an individual basis, 
the functional form of L  may vary across nurses.  
In most cases gitz  and gisz  will not be exactly equal. However, differencing 
across observations when the values of gitz  and gisz  are close, will also approximately 
eliminate the unobserved expectation. Thus, to make the estimator operational, 
Kyriazidou (1997) suggests the following procedure. In the first step, get consistent 
estimates of the parameters in the selection equation. In this study, we estimate a 
conditional logit model using only the nurses who change status over time. In the 
second step, these estimates are used for constructing weights which are then included 
in a weighted least square regression. The estimator is  
( ) ( )
1
1
'
^
ˆ
-
=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--= å
n
i
isitisitisitinn ddxxxxyb                                                  (4. 5) 
                     ( ) ( ) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--´ å
=
n
i
isitisitisitin ddyyxx
1
'yˆ , 
where inyˆ  are «kernel» weights, declining to zero as the difference |ˆˆ| nitnit zz gg -  
increases: 
                                                                 
10 See Kyriazidou for a more detailed discussion on the assumptions needed. 
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( )
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ø
ö
çç
è
æ -
=
n
nisit
n
in h
zz
K
h
g
y
ˆ1
ˆ .                                                                           (4. 6)    
K is a «kernel density» function, and nh  is a sequence of «bandwidths» that tends to 
zero as ¥®n .  
So far all variables in itx  and itz  are assumed to be strictly exogenous. In our 
application this assumption is likely to be violated since wages cannot be considered as 
exogenous in the labour supply equation. However, a straightforward generalization 
by Charlier, Melenberg and Van Soest (1997) allows for endogeneity in the Kyriazidou 
method using an IV estimator11. In particular, they propose the following estimator:  
 ( ) ( )
1
1
'
^
ˆˆˆ
-
=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--= å
n
i
isitisitisitinIV ddxxxxyb                                                   (4. 7) 
       ( ) ( ) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--´ å
=
n
i
isitisitisitin ddyyxx
1
'ˆˆyˆ , 
where ( )isit xx ˆˆ -  are the instruments. This IV estimator may also eliminate a potential 
endogeneity problem due to measurement errors (see Dustmann and Barrachina, 
2000). Notice also that identification of the parameters of interest in this model requires 
exclusion restrictions. This is due to the non-parametric nature of the estimator and 
implies that at least one variable in the selection equation should be excluded from 
both the labour supply equation and from the set of instruments for wage.  
Results 
Most of our discussion will concentrate on the estimated effect of wages on labour 
supply. The results are given in Table 5. The first column reports the OLS estimates, the 
second column the fixed effects  (FE) results, while the results from the sample 
selection model using the Kyriazidou’s method  (K) is presented in column three. The 
results from the IV counterpart of these three models are given in column four (2SLS), 
column five (FE-2SLS) and column six (K-IV).  
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
Age has a significant negative effect for the OLS, 2SLS and K-IV estimators. For these 
estimators the age effect is convex, i. e. the nurses work shorter hours as they become 
older but to a diminishing degree. The effect of family variables is as expected. Being 
                                                                 
11 Charlier, Melenberg and Van Soest (1997) prove the consistency of this estimator.  
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single has a positive and significant effect on hours of work. The presence of children 
in the home has a negative impact on hours of work12. Nurses working in psychiatric 
institutions work longer hours compared to the base category somatic hospitals, 
whereas shorter hours are supplied by nurses engaged in home nursing, as well as in 
nursing homes. We also note that labour supply is highest in the less densely 
populated Northern Norway (the base category). This may reflect the fact that hours of 
work are not allowed to vary as much in these areas. Correcting for sample selection, i. 
e. , applying the K and K-IV estimators yield the result that hours of work increase 
with the size of municipality.  
Compared to a staff nurse, who serves as the base work type category, nursing 
specialists, ward nurses and senior nurses all work longer hours. The reason for this 
may be that younger and less experienced nurses are offered work contracts consisting 
of less working hours, and thus to a larger degree play a role of being residual labour 
in the sense that short term demand and the institution’s financial situation determine 
how much they may work. Focusing now on wages and contractual arrangements, the 
OLS estimator in column 1 finds a significant wage elasticity of 0. 25. Being on shift work 
has a negative effect on hours of work, with a coefficient of -0. 016, as is the effect of 
being on a contract with shorter maximum weekly working hours (hour_35, -0. 027)). 
Since we are comparing nurses working on a contract with maximum 35. 5 hours per 
week (full time) with nurses on a contract stipulating 37. 5 hours per week as 
maximum, the size of this coefficient should be about -0. 05. The results indicate that, in 
addition to wages, the type of contract on which a nurse is engaged, is important for 
deriving labour supply effects. Omitting these variables will lead to biased estimates. 
To see this, we estimated the same model without the shift variables, which resulted in 
a wage elasticity of –0. 35. The interpretation of the shift work variable is that it 
represents the degree of burden by working shift, and the compensation is not high 
enough to have them work longer hours. For the FE and K estimators, the included 
second order effect, shift work 2, is positive and significant, indicating that the burden is 
decreasing in share of overtime. This result is questionable. We note that when we 
correct for endogeneity in wage determination, this second order effect is not 
significant, i. e., the burden is not sensitive to how much shift work is being performed.  
The empirical labour market literature draws particular attention to three 
potential problems that may bias the simple OLS results. These are sample selection 
problems, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of the wage variable. Another 
common problem is related to measurement error. By using register data and not 
                                                                 
12 Non-labour income including spouse's income and capital income was not available for 1998 
and was excluded from our regressions. In regressions using a shorter time span, i.e., excluding 
1998, non-labour income had the expected sign of reducing the hours of work with the 
remaining variables yielding similar results as those reported for Table 5. 
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survey data, we should be much less exposed to the latter. However, we cannot rule 
out measurement problems because there still could be mistakes in reporting from 
health institutions. A priori, we have no reason to assume such mistakes to be 
systematic in any direction.  
We will correct for the above mentioned biases using different estimators. 
Column 2 of Table 5 shows the results of the FE estimator. Notice that if the individual 
fixed effects in the hour equation are positively correlated with the wage, then the OLS 
estimate of the wage effect should be biased upwards. After correcting for unobserved 
heterogeneity, as expected, we find a reduction in the wage effect as compared to the 
OLS results. However, the estimated effect of the wage is negative and significant in 
this model, with a wage elasticity of –0. 05. This is possible but not very likely. The 
variables controlling for shift work have an effect similar to the OLS estimates, and the 
coefficient for the dummy representing contractual hours of work per week is only 
marginally smaller than that for the OLS estimate.  
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose simple tests for sample selection in panel 
data models. One test is to include variables measuring whether the individual is 
observed in the previous period (V1), whether the individual is observed in all periods 
(V2) and the total number of periods the individual is observed (V3). The null 
hypothesis says that these variables should not be significant in our model if there are 
no sample selection problems. Another test, a Hausman type test, compares the fixed 
effects estimator from the balanced sample as opposed to an unbalanced sample. Since 
both tests reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection13, we consider a model that 
explicitly takes sample selection into consideration.  
To implement the Kyriazidou (1997) estimator, we first estimated a conditional 
logit model. This uses only the 11320 individuals who changed status over time. The 
results are given in table A2. As identifying variables in the regression we use a 
number of variables characterizing the regions and municipalities where the 
individuals live (centrality, female work participation rates, availability of kinder-
garten and whether there is a hospital in the municipality). Job-related variables are 
excluded since we do not observe this information for those who do not participate. 
These estimates are then used to construct «kernel weights». We have chosen a normal 
density function for the kernel, while the bandwidth is set to 5/1-×= nhhn  where h = 1. 
Kyriazidou proposed a plug-in procedure to obtain the optimal kernel bandwidth. 
However, experimenting with different values of h had very little effect on the 
estimates in the final regression. Finally, these weights were used in a weighted least 
square regression. To take account of the weights, we apply the Huber/White estimator 
                                                                 
13 The estimates of V1, V2 and V3 were; V1: 0.015 (0.004), V2: -0.008 (0.001) and V3: -0.039 (0.003) 
with standard deviations in parentheses. The result of the Hausman type test were: chi2( 23) = 
60.56 (p-value: 0.00). 
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for the variance. The results from this model are given in column 3 of table 5. To test 
for sample selection, we have applied a Hausman test where we compare the weighted 
model to the same model without weights. This gave a value of the test statistic 
(chi2(23) = 821. 27) that clearly rejected the null hypothesis of no selection. It is there-
fore somewhat surprising that the results from this model correspond quite closely 
with the results from the fixed effect model. One explanation for this could be that 
most of the selection effect works through the individual fixed effects ( ia ), so that the 
unobserved heterogeneity and the selection effect are differenced out in the FE model.  
So far we have considered the wage as exogenous. This is probably too restrictive 
an assumption, and in column 4, 5 and 6 we present IV counterparts of the OLS, FE 
and K estimators. As instruments for the wage of nurses we have used the financial 
situation of the municipality, measured by lagged net financial surplus in preceding 
period. Further instruments are lagged mean wage of auxiliary nurses working in the 
same municipality as the nurse, and each nurse’s work experience. These variables are 
assumed to affect wages of nurses but not their hours of work. Experience will affect 
wages through seniority rules, and when controlling for age it is reasonable that 
experience does not have an additional effect on working hours. Both net financial 
surplus and wages of auxiliary nurses are proxies for the financial strength and 
corresponding wage capacity of administrative units owning and running health care 
institutions. The instruments pass the Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions14. 
The corresponding results for the wage equations are reported in Table A1.  
The effect on the wage elasticity is larger in all three IV models compared to the 
previous models. Apart from variables representing contracts and type of position 
held, there are no dramatic changes in sign and size of the estimated coefficients. We 
note that when controlling for endogeneity in wage determination, the different types 
of nurses are now more similar in working hours, and as noted above the burden of 
shift work no longer seems to be diminishing in magnitude. The negative wage 
elasticities disappear, and the second order effect of shift work and the size of the 
‘maximum hours per week’ coefficient are more reasonable. Focusing first on the 2SLS 
estimator, we find that the wage elasticity increases to 0. 46, which is higher than what 
is found in several other studies cited above. The coefficient for the variable 
representing burden of shift work is marginally higher in absolute value than that of 
OLS, now at –0. 017. We also find an estimated coefficient on «Hour_35. 5» closer to the 
expected 5% (0. 036).  
Similarly, the FE-2SLS wage elasticity estimate of 0. 24 is higher than that 
reported by the FE estimator. However, this estimate is not significant at the ordinary 
5% level. The Kyriazidou-IV estimator produces a smaller, and significant, elasticity at 
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0. 2115. The variables representing shift work show similar results to what was found in 
the 2SLS model, i. e. , a significantly negative effect, as is expected, but with no clear 
second order effect. The coefficient for the variable representing contractual 
(maximum) hours of work per week, «Hour_35. 5», is higher than in 2SLS, now at –0. 
04, and thus better determined given its expected size.  
There is little difference in the estimates of the fixed effects 2SLS and the sample 
selection K-IV estimator. Nevertheless, Column 6 gives our preferred estimates of the 
nurses’ labour supply because it guards against sample selection. Taking into 
consideration that there is some selection into work, and having controlled for type of 
contracts, as well as the endogeneity in determination of wages and hours-of-work, we 
find that wage elasticities are positive and significant and estimated to be around 0. 21.  
Concluding remarks 
Based on studies of nurses’ labour supply in the UK and USA, there is ample evidence 
indicating that nurses’ wage elasticities are small. We have found that this is indeed the 
case in our panel data set of Norwegian nurses. This result obtained whenever we 
ignored the endogeneity of wage determination using the OLS estimator. We also 
obtained a negative and significant wage elasticity when using the fixed effects 
estimator, i. e. , after controlling for nurses' heterogeneity, and similarly after correcting 
for sample selection using the Kyriazidou estimator. However, we have shown that 
important effects may relate to the simultaneous determination of wages and hours of 
work. This may be due to the wage bargaining process and the role played by the 
demand side in the labour market for nurses, which is represented by hospitals and 
other institutions that are publicly owned (municipalities and counties), and which are 
likely to have some degree of market power in their local labour markets. Larger 
positive and significant wage elasticities were obtained using FE2SLS and the IV 
counterpart of the Kyriazidou estimator suggested by Charlier et. al (1997).  
Another important result from our analysis is that contractual information 
should be included in the determination of health personnel’s labour supply. In 
particular, omitting information about shift work, which is commonly performed by 
nurses, will bias the estimates of the wage elasticity. The reason is that the work 
contract specifies working conditions and payment, including standard hours of work 
and compensation for work outside of normal working hours.  
The magnitude of the wage elasticity depends on the estimator chosen. The wage 
elasticities are higher when instrumenting for wages, and an elasticity of 0. 2, as in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
14 A test of overidentifying restrictions gave Chi2(1) = 5.999  (p-value = 0.11) in the FE-2SLS 
model. 
15 A Hausman type test rejected the null hypothesis of no sample selection (chi2( 23) = 842.70). 
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preferred K-IV model, is higher than what is reported in some other studies. The 
Hausman test performed shows that our estimator is consistent for this choice of 
instruments.  
A policy implication of the results reported here would be that wages matter for 
nurses’ labour supply but that several institutional aspects play important roles for 
how many hours of work are performed. In addition to contractual arrangements, the 
health institutions’ financial situation as well as governing structures may be 
important.  
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Data appendix 
The hourly wage is calculated by first adding the monthly basic income, overtime pay 
and all bonuses, and then dividing this total income by the number of hours worked. 
Bonuses include compensation for shift work on evenings, nights and weekends, and 
regular bonuses. Regular bonuses are typically compensation for meetings or other 
work outside normal working hours, mostly paid to ward nurses and leading nurses. 
Finally the wage is discounted by a price index.  
Shift work is calculated as the share of total monthly income that a nurse receives 
as compensation for shift work. Another possibility would be the proportion of hours 
worked outside normal hours (shift hours divided by total hours of work). However, 
we do not have information about the actual number of shift hours, but believe that 
shift work is a close substitute for the exact magnitude of individual shift work. An 
advantage of calculating the importance of shift work this way, is that it implicitly 
takes into consideration that shift work of different types may be differently 
compensated due to variations in the burden of this particular type of work.  
Hour_35. 5 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the nurse is on a shift contract, 
which implies a maximum of 35. 5 hours per week for full time nurses, 0 otherwise.  
The nurses in our sample are divided into four categories: staff nurse, specialist 
nurse, ward nurse and leading nurse. Staff nurses have 3 (4) years of college education. 
Specialist nurses are nurses with at least one year of specialist training, in e. g. 
anaesthesia, surgery or intensive care. Ward nurses are nurses who are in charge of a 
ward, whereas leading nurses are in charge of a larger unit.  
Centrality indicates the geographical position of the municipality in relation to 
larger urban settlement. The classification is performed by Statistics Norway and it is 
based on travelling time to a centre where a higher order of central functions is found. 
«Centrality level 0» consists of the least central municipalities, whereas the most central 
municipalities are found in «Centrality level 3».  
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Table 1. Number of observations each year 
 Total sample Out of work NALRA sample NALRA sub sample 
1993 28734 (14. 7) 2343 (8. 2) 19399 (14. 6) 10152 (14. 7) 
1994 29996 (15. 3) 2497 (8. 3) 19878 (14. 9) 10888 (15. 8) 
1995 31534 (16. 1) 2593 (8. 2) 21297 (16. 0) 12422 (18. 0) 
1996 33396 (17. 0) 2596 (7. 8) 22969 (17. 2) 11280 (16. 3) 
1997 35243 (18. 0) 2873 (8. 2) 24437 (18. 3) 11825 (17. 1) 
1998 37161 (19. 0) 3055 (8. 2) 25358 (19. 0) 12555 (18. 2) 
Total 196064 (100) 15957 (8. 1) 133338 (100) 69122 (100) 
 
 
Table 2. Sample frequencies by number of work years.  
No. of  years Total sample NALRA sample NALRA sub sample 
0 1098 (2. 7) - - 
1 3639 (9. 0) 4601 (13. 9) 4365 (22. 2) 
2 3520 (8. 7) 4122 (12. 4) 2730 (13. 9) 
3 3639 (9. 0) 4243 (12. 8) 3051 (15. 5) 
4 3579 (8. 9) 4179 (12. 6) 2218 (11. 3) 
5 4851 (12. 0) 4988 (15. 1) 2511 (12. 8) 
6 19990 (49. 6) 11018 (33. 2) 4763 (24. 3) 
Total 40316 (100) 33151 (100) 19638 (100) 
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Table 3. Variable definitions 
Variable name                                                         Definition                                           
Hours per year Regular hours plus overtime.  
Hourly wage Hourly wage including all bonuses and overtime in NOK.  
Shift work Share of the monthly income that is bonus due to late, night and 
weekend duties.  
Hour_35. 5 1 if the individual is on a contract with maximum 35. 5 hours per week 
for full time nurses, 0 otherwise.  
Age Respondent’s age.  
Age2 Age squared.  
Experience  Number of years working as nurse.  
Experience2  Experience squared.  
Disable 1 if the individual is more than 50 percent disabled, 0 otherwise.  
Number of children Number of children younger than 18.  
Children < 3 1 if the nurse have children aged 2 or younger, 0 otherwise.  
Children 3 –7 1 if the nurse have children between the ages of 3 and 7, 0 otherwise.  
Children > 7 1 if the nurse have children older than 7, 0 otherwise.  
Married 1 if the respondent is married or cohabitant with children, and 0 
otherwise.  
Position Respondent  working as: 
 Staff nurse 
 Nursing specialist 
 Ward nurse 
 Senior nurse 
Working place Nurse working in: 
 Hospital 
 Psychiatric 
 Home nursing 
 Health service 
 Nursing home 
 Other 
Wage of auxiliary nurses  Mean wage of auxiliary nurses working in the same municipality as the 
nurse 
Municipality net surplus Net working expenses in the municipality 
Hospital in municipality 1 if there is a hospital in the municipality where the nurse lives, 0 
otherwise 
Availability kindergarten  Number of children aged 2 or younger in kindergarten divided by the 
total number of children aged 2 or younger in the municipality  
Municipality size Number of inhabitants in the municipality 
Participation rate Number of females working divided by all females in the municipality 
Region Nurse living in: 
 East Norway 
 South Norway 
 West Norway  
 Mid Norway 
 North Norway 
Centrality: Measures a municipality’s geographical position related to the nearest 
centre with central functions.  
 Centrality level 0 (least central) 
 Centrality level 1 
 Centrality level 2 
 Centrality level 3 (most central) 
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Table 4. Sample statistics, means and standard deviations (in parentheses).  
                                                   Total sample                          NALRA sample             NALRA sub-sample 
Hours per year - - 1382. 4 (360. 7) 
Hourly wage - - 129. 7 (17. 2) 
Shift work - - 12. 0  (8. 1) 
Hour_35. 5 - 0. 79 (0. 41) 0. 86 (0. 34) 
Disable 0. 02 (0. 15) 0. 01 (0. 10) 0. 01 (0. 1) 
Age 37. 46 (8. 26) 37. 30 (8. 13) 37. 0 (7. 9) 
Single 0. 36 (0. 48) 0. 36 (0. 48) 0. 35 (0. 48) 
Number of children <18 1. 19 (1. 14) 1. 19 (1. 12) 1. 21 (1. 10) 
Children < 3 0. 22 (0. 41) 0. 21 (0. 41) 0. 22 (0. 42) 
Children 3 – 7 0. 28 (0. 45) 0. 28 (0. 45) 0. 29 (0. 45) 
Children > 7 0. 31 (0. 46) 0. 31 (0. 46) 0 . 32 (0. 47) 
Hospital - 0. 52 (0. 50) 0 . 62 (0. 49) 
Psychiatric - 0. 03 (0. 18) 0. 05 (0. 21) 
Home nursing - 0. 12 (0. 33) 0. 10 (0. 30) 
Health service - 0. 07 (0. 25) 0. 01 (0. 10) 
Nursing home - 0. 21 (0. 41) 0. 20 (0. 40) 
Other - 0. 04 (0. 20) 0. 03 (0. 16) 
Staff nurse - 0. 57 (0. 49) 0. 62 (0. 49) 
Nursing specialist - 0. 21 (0. 41) 0. 20 (0. 40) 
Ward nurse - 0. 19 (0. 39) 0. 16 (0. 37) 
Senior nurse - 0. 02 (0. 12) 0 . 02 (0. 12) 
Experience - 12. 66 (7. 77) 12. 53 (7. 66) 
East-Norway 0. 48 (0. 50) 0. 45 (0. 50) 0. 46 (0. 50) 
South-Norway 0. 13 (0. 34) 0. 14 (0. 35) 0. 18 (0. 38) 
West-Norway 0. 18 (0. 38) 0. 19 (0. 39) 0. 08 (0. 27) 
Mid-Norway  0. 10 (0. 29) 0. 10 (0. 31) 0. 16 (0. 36) 
North-Norway 0. 11 (0. 31) 0. 13 (0. 33) 0. 13 (0. 34) 
Hospital in municipality 0. 59 (0. 49) 0. 58 (0. 49) 0. 56 (0. 50) 
Availability kindergarten  0. 24 (0. 09) 0. 24 (0. 09) 0. 23 (0. 08) 
Participation rate 0. 40 (0. 05) 0. 40 (0. 05) 0. 39 (0. 04) 
Municipality size 92. 96 (138. 86) 72. 08 (115. 57) 41. 73 (54. 51) 
Wage auxiliary nurses 86. 76 (2. 95) 86. 76 (2. 95) 86. 55 (2. 71) 
Municipality net surplus 1322. 74 (1766. 41) 1162. 35 (1742. 78) 972. 82 (1626. 96) 
Centr0 0. 12 (0. 33) 0. 14 (0. 35) 0. 14 (0. 35) 
Centr1 0. 12 (0. 32) 0. 13 (0. 34) 0. 10 (0. 30) 
Centr2  0. 22 (0. 41) 0. 24 (0. 42) 0. 35 (0. 48) 
Centr3 0. 54 (0. 50) 0. 48 (0. 50) 0. 41 (0. 49) 
Sample size 196064 133338 69122 
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 Table 5 . Estimated effects on nurses labour supply 
                                               OLS           FE                K                2SLS       FE-2SLS         K-IV  
Ln wage  0. 2543** 
(0. 0105) 
-0. 0522 ** 
(0. 0118) 
-0. 0517 ** 
(0. 0082) 
0. 4600** 
(0. 0353) 
0. 2409 
(0. 1335) 
0. 2078* 
(0. 0942) 
Shift work  -0. 0157 ** 
(0. 0004) 
-0. 0094 ** 
(0. 0004) 
-0. 0094 ** 
(0. 0003) 
-0. 0172 ** 
(0. 0004) 
-0. 0114 ** 
(0. 0010) 
-0. 0111 ** 
(0. 0007) 
Shift work 2 0. 00002 
(0. 00001) 
0. 00002* 
(0. 00001) 
0. 00002* 
(0. 00001) 
-0. 00000 
(0. 00001) 
-0. 00000 
(0. 00001) 
-0. 00000 
(0. 00001) 
Hour_35. 5  -0. 0267 ** 
(0. 0034) 
-0. 0260 ** 
(0. 0042) 
-0. 0273 ** 
(0. 0029) 
-0. 0358 ** 
(0. 0038) 
-0. 0405 ** 
(0. 0078) 
-0. 0397 ** 
(0. 0053) 
Disable  -0. 3809 ** 
(0. 0096) 
-0. 3057 ** 
(0. 0194) 
-0. 2588 ** 
(0. 0259) 
-0. 3763 ** 
(0. 0096) 
-0. 3012 ** 
(0. 0197) 
-0. 2581 ** 
(0. 0261) 
Age  -0. 0096 ** 
(0. 0011) 
0. 0028 
(0. 0030) 
0. 0020 
(0. 0022) 
-0. 0128 ** 
(0. 0012) 
-0. 0111  
(0. 0070) 
-0. 0098 * 
(0. 0048) 
Age2  0. 00005** 
(0. 00001) 
0. 0001** 
(0. 00004) 
0. 0002** 
(0. 00002) 
0. 0001** 
(0. 00001) 
0. 0002** 
(0. 00005) 
0. 0003** 
(0. 00003) 
Single 0. 0565** 
(0. 0021) 
0. 0177** 
(0. 0051) 
0. 0209** 
(0. 0035) 
0. 0542** 
(0. 0022) 
0. 0172** 
(0. 0051) 
0. 0205** 
(0. 0035) 
Number of children -0. 0423 ** 
(0. 0017) 
-0. 1005 ** 
(0. 0042) 
-0. 1033 ** 
(0. 0032) 
-0. 0449 ** 
(0. 0017) 
-0. 0955 ** 
(0. 0048) 
-0. 0991 ** 
(0. 0035) 
Children < 3 -0. 0999 ** 
(0. 0028) 
-0. 0563 ** 
(0. 0038) 
-0. 0478 ** 
(0. 0027) 
-0. 0961 ** 
(0. 0029) 
-0. 0579 ** 
(0. 0038) 
-0. 0495 ** 
(0. 0028) 
Children 3 - 7 -0. 0630 ** 
(0. 0027) 
-0. 0230 ** 
(0. 0033) 
-0. 0159 ** 
(0. 0023) 
-0. 0618 ** 
(0. 0027) 
-0. 0250 ** 
(0. 0034) 
-0. 0177** 
(0. 0024) 
Children > 7 -0. 0480 ** 
(0. 0030) 
-0. 0360 ** 
(0. 0030) 
-0. 0305 ** 
(0. 0021) 
-0. 0449 ** 
(0. 0030) 
-0. 0360 ** 
(0. 0031) 
-0. 0307 ** 
(0. 0021) 
Psychiatric 0. 0316** 
(0. 0045) 
0. 0497** 
(0. 0111) 
0. 0497** 
(0. 0091) 
0. 0312** 
(0. 0045) 
0. 0456** 
(0. 0113) 
0. 0466** 
(0. 0092) 
Home nursing -0. 0352 ** 
(0. 0033) 
-0. 0073 
(0. 0070) 
-0. 0136 * 
(0. 0062) 
-0. 0364 ** 
(0. 0033) 
-0. 0162 * 
(0. 0082) 
-0. 0206 ** 
(0. 0067) 
Health service -0. 0714 ** 
(0. 0090) 
-0. 0439 ** 
(0. 0174) 
-0. 0543 ** 
(0. 0149) 
-0. 0697 ** 
(0. 0090) 
-0. 0482 ** 
(0. 0176) 
-0. 0567 ** 
(0. 0148) 
Nursing home -0. 0339 ** 
(0. 0025) 
-0. 0079  
(0. 0060) 
-0. 0101 * 
(0. 0053) 
-0. 0354 ** 
(0. 0025) 
-0. 0172 * 
(0. 0074) 
-0. 0177 ** 
(0. 0059) 
Other -0. 0303 ** 
(0. 0059) 
-0. 0127 
(0. 0088) 
-0. 0095 
(0. 0075) 
-0. 0300 ** 
(0. 0059) 
0. 0051 
(0. 0095) 
0. 0024 
(0. 0078) 
Nursing specialist 0. 0560** 
(0. 0027) 
0. 0311** 
(0. 0048) 
0. 0307** 
(0. 0035) 
0. 0392** 
(0. 0039) 
0. 0124 
(0. 0098) 
0. 0144* 
(0. 0067) 
Ward nurse 0. 0538** 
(0. 0030) 
0. 0212** 
(0. 0039) 
0. 0190** 
(0. 0029) 
0. 0352** 
(0. 0043) 
-0. 0013  
(0. 0110) 
-0. 0004  
(0. 0076) 
Senior nurse 0. 0917** 
(0. 0083) 
0. 0369** 
(0. 0120) 
0. 0360** 
(0. 0065) 
0. 0574** 
(0. 0101) 
0. 0019 
(0. 0199) 
0. 0057 
(0. 0123) 
East Norway 
 
-0. 0850 ** 
(0. 0029) 
-0. 0487 ** 
(0. 0135) 
-0. 0697 ** 
(0. 0131) 
-0. 0801 ** 
(0. 0031) 
-0. 0405 ** 
(0. 0141) 
-0. 0622 ** 
(0. 0131) 
South Norway 
 
-0. 1277 ** 
(0. 0035) 
-0. 0854 ** 
(0. 0169) 
-0. 0893 ** 
(0. 0170) 
-0. 1214 ** 
(0. 0036) 
-0. 0737 ** 
(0. 0178) 
-0. 0802 ** 
(0. 0170) 
West Norway 
 
-0. 0892 ** 
(0. 0042) 
-0. 1089 ** 
(0. 0194) 
-0. 1164 ** 
(0. 0218) 
-0. 0823 ** 
(0. 0043) 
-0. 0994 ** 
(0. 0200) 
-0. 1157 ** 
(0. 0218) 
Mid Norway  
 
-0. 1128 ** 
(0. 0037) 
-0. 1084 ** 
(0. 0163) 
-0. 1103 ** 
(0. 0187) 
-0. 1080 ** 
(0. 0038) 
-0. 0985 ** 
(0. 0171) 
-0. 1011 ** 
(0. 0188) 
Municipality size 
 
0. 00001 
(0. 00001) 
0. 00006 
(0. 00004) 
0. 0002** 
(0. 0001) 
0. 00001 
(0. 00001) 
0. 00005 
(0. 00004) 
0. 0002* 
(0. 00007) 
Constant  6. 6072** 
(0. 0498) 
7. 4675** 
(0. 0704) 
0. 0065** 
(0. 0014) 
5. 7145** 
(0. 1546) 
6. 4896** 
(0. 4493) 
-0. 0068 ** 
(0. 0014) 
Number of observations  
 
69122 69122 121622 69122 69122 121622 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** and * is statistically different from zero at one and five percent 
significance level, respectively.  
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Table A1. Wage equations 
                                             OLS                      FE                          K                                      
Shift work 0. 0071** 
(0. 0001) 
0. 0069** 
(0. 0001) 
0. 0068** 
(0. 0001) 
Shift work 2 0. 0001** 
(0. 00003) 
0. 0001** 
(0. 00004) 
0. 0001** 
(0. 00003) 
Hour_35. 5 0. 0466** 
(0. 0012) 
0. 0488** 
(0. 0016) 
0. 0479** 
(0. 0010) 
Disable -0. 0248** 
(0. 0033) 
-0. 0165* 
(0. 0074) 
-0. 0056 
(0. 0154) 
Age 0. 0092** 
(0. 0004) 
0. 0377** 
(0. 0013) 
0. 0363** 
(0. 0009) 
Age2 -0. 0001** 
(0. 00004) 
-0. 0002** 
(0. 00001) 
-0. 0002** 
(0. 00001) 
Single 0. 0107** 
(0. 0007) 
-0. 0016 
(0. 0019) 
0. 0017 
(0. 0013) 
Number of children 0. 0085** 
(0. 0006) 
-0. 0165** 
(0. 0016) 
-0. 0155** 
(0. 0011) 
Children < 3 -0. 0159** 
(0. 0010) 
0. 0047** 
(0. 0014) 
0. 0060** 
(0. 0009) 
Children 3 - 7 0. 0041** 
(0. 0009) 
0. 0064** 
(0. 0012) 
0. 0067** 
(0. 0008) 
Children > 7 -0. 0120** 
(0. 0010) 
0. 0003 
(0. 0012) 
0. 0008 
(0. 0007) 
Psychiatric 0. 0053** 
(0. 0016) 
0. 0144** 
(0. 0042) 
0. 0131** 
(0. 0029) 
Home nursing 0. 0152** 
(0. 0011) 
0. 0308** 
(0. 0028) 
0. 0273** 
(0. 0018) 
Health service 0. 0006 
(0. 0031) 
0. 0174** 
(0. 0066) 
0. 0115* 
(0. 0046) 
Nursing home 0. 0155** 
(0. 0009) 
0. 0326** 
(0. 0023) 
0. 0300** 
(0. 0015) 
Other 0. 0069** 
(0. 0020) 
0. 0267** 
(0. 0033) 
0. 0279** 
(0. 0023) 
Nursing specialist 0. 0732** 
(0. 0009) 
0. 0641** 
(0. 0018) 
0. 0627** 
(0. 0012) 
Ward nurse 0. 0840** 
(0. 0010) 
0. 0766** 
(0. 0015) 
0. 0746** 
(0. 0009) 
Senior nurse 0. 1582** 
(0. 0028) 
0. 1197** 
(0. 0045) 
0. 1171** 
(0. 0029) 
East Norway 
 
-0. 0267** 
(0. 0010) 
-0. 0275** 
(0. 0051) 
-0. 0278** 
(0. 0042) 
South Norway 
 
-0. 0285** 
(0. 0012) 
-0. 0397** 
(0. 0064) 
-0. 0333** 
(0. 0052) 
West Norway 
 
0. 0002 
(0. 0015) 
-0. 0328** 
(0. 0074) 
-0. 0034 
(0. 0078) 
Mid Norway  
 
-0. 0158** 
(0. 0013) 
-0. 0441** 
(0. 0063) 
-0. 0423** 
(0. 0055) 
Size of municipality  
 
0. 00003** 
(0. 00001) 
0. 0002** 
(0. 00002) 
0. 0002** 
(0. 00002) 
Experience 
 
0. 0064** 
(0. 0001) 
0. 0067** 
(0. 0004) 
0. 0065** 
(0. 0003) 
Experience2 -0. 00006** 
(0. 000002) 
-0. 00006** 
(0. 000005) 
-0. 00006** 
(0. 000003) 
Lag of wage auxiliary 
nurses  
0. 0078** 
(0. 0001) 
0. 0008** 
(0. 0001) 
0. 0005** 
(0. 0001) 
Lag of municipality net 
surplus 
-0. 00001 
(0. 00003) 
-0. 00005** 
(0. 000005) 
-0. 00001** 
(0. 000003) 
Constant 3. 7725** 
(0. 0140) 
3. 4683** 
(0. 0276) 
0. 0009 
(0. 0006) 
Number of observations 69122 69122 121622 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** and * is statistically different from zero at one  
and five percent significance level, respectively.  
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Table A2. Participation equation. Conditional logit 
Educated as nursing 
specialist 
 0. 6155** (0. 0685) 
Age    0. 1125** (0. 0340) 
Age2  -0. 0035** (0. 0004) 
Single  -0. 1256*  (0. 0550) 
Number of children  -0. 2640** (0. 0457) 
Children < 3  -0. 1424** (0. 0424) 
Children 3 – 7   0. 0725    (0. 0385) 
Children > 7  -0. 0619    (0. 0369) 
Disable -1. 2678** (0. 2240) 
Hospital in municipality   0. 6463** (0. 0617) 
Availability kindergarten    0. 3303    (0. 2511) 
Participation rate    0. 0345**  (0. 0073) 
East-Norway 0. 5275**  (0. 1198) 
South-Norway 0. 8874**  (0. 1448) 
West-Norway -0. 8383** (0. 1318) 
Mid-Norway  1. 4610** (0. 1429) 
Municipality size -0. 0082** (0. 0003) 
Centrality level 1  -0. 0471    (0. 1615) 
Centrality level 2  -0. 5202** (0. 1809) 
Centrality level 3    -0. 5408** (0. 1387) 
Log likelihood -22287. 461 
Number of observations 61464 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** and * is statistically different  
from zero at one and five percent significance level, respectively.  
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